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9.1 Introduction
Data security is today an important requirement in various applications because of
the stringent need to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of informa-
tion. Comprehensive solutions to data security are quite complicated and require the
integration of diﬀerent tools and techniques as well as specific organizational pro-
cesses. In such a context, a fundamental role is played by the access control system
(ACS) that establishes which subjects are authorized to perform which operations
on which objects. Subjects are individuals or programs or other entities requiring
access to the protected resources. When dealing with protection of information, the
resources of interest are typically objects that record information, such as files in
an operating system, tuples in a relational database, or a complex object in an ob-
ject database. Because of its relevance in the context of solutions for information
security, access control has been extensively investigated for database management
systems (DBMSs) [6], digital libraries [3, 14], and multimedia applications [24].
Yet, the importance of the spatial dimension in access control has been highlighted
only recently. We say that access control has a spatial dimension when the autho-
rization to access a resource depends on position information. We broadly categorize
spatially aware access control as object-driven, subject-driven, and hybrid based on
whether the position information concerns objects, subjects, or both, respectively. In
the former case, the spatial dimension is introduced because of the spatial nature of
resources. For example, if the resources are georeferenced Earth images, then we can
envisage an individual be allowed to only display images covering a certain region.
The spatial dimension may also be required because of the spatial nature of subjects.
This is the case of mobile individuals allowed to access a resource when located in a
given area. For example, an individual may be authorized to view secret information
only within a military base. Finally, position information may concern both objects
and subjects like in the case of an individual authorized to display images of a region
only within a military oﬃce.
There is a wide range of applications which motivate spatially aware access
control. The two challenging and contrasting applications we propose as examples
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are the spatial data infrastructures (SDI) and location-based services (LBS). An
SDI consists of the technological and organizational infrastructure which enables
the sharing and coordinated maintenance of spatial data among multiple heteroge-
neous organizations, primarily public administrations, and government agencies. On
the other side, LBS enable mobile users equipped with location-aware terminals to
access information based on the position of terminals. These applications have diﬀer-
ent requirements on access control. In an SDI, typically, there is the need to account
for various complex structured spatial data that may have multiple representations
across diﬀerent organizations. In an SDI, the access control is thus object-driven.
Conversely, in LBS, there is the need to account for a dynamic and mobile user pop-
ulation which may request diversified services based on position. Access control is
thus subject-driven or hybrid. However, despite the variety of requirements and the
importance of spatial data protection in these and other applications, very few eﬀorts
have been devoted to the investigation of spatially aware access control models and
systems.
In this chapter, we pursue two main goals: the first is to present an overview of
this emerging research area and in particular of requirements and research directions;
the second is to analyze in more detail some research issues, focusing in particular on
access control in LBS. We can expect LBS to be widely deployed in the near future
when advanced wireless networks, such as mobile geosensor networks, and new po-
sitioning technologies, such as the Galileo satellite system will come into operation.
In this perspective, access control will become increasingly important, especially for
enabling selective access to services such as Enterprise LBS, which provide informa-
tion services to mobile organizations, such as health care and fleet management enter-
prises. An access control model targeting mobile organizations is GEO-RBAC [4].
Such a model is based on the RBAC (role-based access control) standard and is
compliant with Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) standards with respect to the
representation of the spatial dimension of the model.
The main contributions of the chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We provide an overview of the ongoing research in the field of spatially aware
access control.
• We show how the spatial dimension is interconnected with the security aspects
in a specific access control model, that is, GEO-RBAC.
• We outline relevant architectural issues related to the implementation of an ACS
based on the GEO-RBAC model. In particular, we present possible strategies for
security enforcement and the architecture of a decentralized ACS for large-scale
LBS applications.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides some background
knowledge on data security and in particular access control models. The subsequent
section presents requirements for geospatial data security and then the state of the art.
Afterward the GEO-RBAC model is introduced. In particular, we present the main
concepts of the model defined in the basic layer of the model, the Core GEO-RBAC.
Hence, architectural approaches supporting GEO-RBAC are presented. Open issues
are finally reported in the concluding section along with directions for future work.
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9.2 Background Knowledge on Data Security
9.2.1 Data Security
Broadly speaking, data security aims at protecting information against security
breaches. Security breaches can be categorized as unauthorized data observation,
incorrect data modification, and data unavailability.
Data unavailability occurs when information which is crucial for the functioning
of the organization is not ready when needed. Information security means assur-
ing [8]:
• confidentiality, thus protecting data against unauthorized disclosures;
• integrity, thus preventing unauthorized data modification;
• availability, thus recovering from hardware and software errors and malicious
data denials.
These requirements raise practically in all application contexts. For example,
Chap. 10 in this book focuses on confidentiality and integrity requirements in the
context of outsourced-based architectures. In location-based applications, which is
our concern, confidentiality is requested to protect various types of information
which include, besides the information resources requested by the user, the location
of mobile users. Integrity is needed to protect, among others, the information which
is transmitted to and from the mobile devices against unauthorized modifications.
Data availability is also needed to ensure the availability of the position.
Data security is supported by various tools and systems, including authentication,
access control, and audit. Among these, access control is fundamental to ensure con-
fidentiality and integrity of information resources made available to multiple users.
The component in charge of access control is the ACS. When a user tries to access
an information resource, a component of such system, the access control mechanism
checks the rights of the requester against a set of authorizations, usually specified
by a security administrator. An authorization states which user, or more generally,
which subject can perform which operation on which objects. An authorization is
defined as the triple: < s, op, ob j >, where s, op, and ob j refer to subject, operation,
and object, respectively. The subject identifies the holder of the authorization. It can
be a single or group of individuals or programs. The object identifies the resource.
The nature and granularity of the resource depend on the application. The opera-
tion defines what the subject is authorized to do with the specified object. The set of
authorizations defined by the organization constitutes the access control policy. Such
a policy is defined using a policy language based on an access control model. In what
follows, we present a classification of access control models.
9.2.2 Access Control Models
Access control models can be categorized into: mandatory, discretionary, and role-
based access control (RBAC) models. Mandatory access control (MAC) developed
in a military and national security setting; discretionary access control (DAC) has
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its roots in academic and commercial research laboratories; the RBAC model, since
the seminal paper of [23], has gained increasingly consensus in the research com-
munity as well as in industry to finally become a standard widely adopted by
organizations [13].
Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory access control models control accesses on the basis of a predefined classi-
fication of subjects and objects in the system. Objects are the passive entities storing
information, such as relations in a DBMS. Subjects are active entities performing
data accesses. The classification is based on a number of access classes, also called
labels which are associated with every subject and object in the system. A subject is
granted authorization to access a given object if and only if some relationship, de-
pending on the access mode, is satisfied between the classifications of the subject and
the object. An access class generally consists of two components: a security level and
a set of categories. The security level is an element of a hierarchically ordered set.
A very well-known example of such a set is the one including the levels TopSecret
(TS), Secret (S), Confidential (C), and Unclassified (U), where TS > S > C > U.
The set of categories is an unordered set (e.g. NATO, Nuclear, Army). Access classes
are partially ordered as follows. An access class ci dominates ≥ an access class c j
iﬀ the security level of ci is greater than or equal to that of c j and the categories of
ci include those of c j.The security level of the access class reflects the sensitivity of
the information contained in the object. Categories are used to provide finer-grained
security classifications of subjects and objects. Access control is based on two prin-
ciples, formulated by Bell and LaPadula, which are followed by all models enforcing
a mandatory security policy. The first states that a subject can read only those objects
whose access class is dominated by the access class of the subject; the second states
that a subject can write only those objects whose access class dominates the access
class of the subject. The application of MAC policies to relational DBMSs has been
extensively investigated over the past years. The introduction of such a model entails
the solution of several diﬃcult issues. Because of this complexity, the adoption of
such a model in DBMSs is not as common as the next model.
Discretionary Access Control
These models are discretionary in the sense that they allow users to grant other users
authorization to access the data. Specifically, DAC policies regulate the access of
users on the basis of the user’s identity and authorizations that specify, for each user
(or group of users) and each object in the system, the access modes (e.g. read, write,
or execute) the user is allowed on the object. Each request of a user to access an
object is checked against the specified authorizations. If there exists an authorization
stating that the user can access the object in the specific mode, the access is granted,
otherwise it is denied [22]. Because of such flexibility, discretionary policies are
adopted in many applications. An important aspect of DAC is related to the autho-
rization administration policy. Authorization administration refers to the function of
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granting and revoking authorizations. It is the function by which authorizations are
entered (removed) into (from) the ACS. Common administration policies include the
centralized administration policy, by which only some privileged users may grant
and revoke authorizations, and the ownership-based administration, by which grant
and revoke operations on a data objects are issued by the creator of the object. The
ownership-based administration is often extended with features for administration
delegation. Administration delegation allows the owner of an object to assign other
users the right to grant and revoke authorizations, thus enabling decentralized autho-
rization administration.
Role-based Access Control
Role-based access control is centered on the notion of role. A role is a semantic
construct which represents a job function within an organization. Specifically, the
RBAC standard consists of four basic sets of elements: users, roles, permissions, and
sessions.
• User is as a human being or an autonomous agent.
• Role represents the function of a user within a community. The community can
be a structured organization, for example, a business enterprise or a more in-
formal community, for example the citizens of a city. A role confers a set of
permissions on the user.
• Permission. Permission is an approval to perform an operation on one or more
objects. An object is a resource that shall be protected. An operation is an
executable image of a program, which on invocation executes some function
for the user over some object. The types of operations and objects depend on the
application context in which RBAC is deployed. For example, in a file system,
operations might include read, write, and execute; in a DBMS, operations might
include insert, delete, append, and update.
• Session. When the user logs in, a session is established, during which the user
activates some subset of roles that he or she is assigned. The permissions avail-
able to the user of the session are thus the permissions assigned to the roles that
are currently active across all the user’s sessions.
Over the above sets of elements, a number of relations are defined. The user
assignment relates users to roles through a many-to-many relationship, a user can
therefore be assigned multiple roles and the same role assigned to diﬀerent users. The
permission-assignment relation relates roles and permissions again through a many-
to-many relationship; thus a role can be assigned multiple permissions and similarly
each permission can be assigned to multiple roles. The function SessionUser maps
each session into a user, whereas the SessionRole function maps a session onto a
set of roles, namely the roles that are active in the session. The basic concepts are
formally summarized as follows:
Definition 9.1 (Basic Concepts of RBAC ). Let U, R, PRMS, and SES denote the
set of users, roles, permissions, and sessions, respectively. We define:
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• UA ⊆ U × R. The user assignment relation that assigns users to roles.
• AssignedUser : R→ 2U. The mapping from a role to a set of users.
• PA ⊆ R × PRMS . The permission assignment relation that assigns permissions
to roles.
• PrmsAssignment : R → 2PRMS . The mapping of a role into a set of
permissions.
• S essionUser : S ES → U. The mapping from a session to a user.
• S essionRole : S ES → 2R. The mapping from a session to a set of roles. 
RBAC standard is defined at three levels, which are referred as Core, Hierarchical,
and Constrained RBAC, respectively. Core RBAC defines the minimum collection of
RBAC elements, element sets, and relations for a RBAC system to be defined. The
Hierarchical RBAC component adds relations for supporting role hierarchies. A hi-
erarchy is a partial order defining a seniority relation between roles, whereby senior
roles acquire the permissions of their juniors. Constrained RBAC adds separation
of duty (SoD) constraints to the RBAC [13]. SoD constraints are introduced to pre-
vent conflicts of interest arising when a single individual can simultaneously perform
sensitive tasks requiring the use of mutually exclusive duties. In the RBAC standard,
enforcement of SoD policies is realized by specifying exclusive role constraints. As
an additional level, administrative functions are defined to enable policy specifica-
tion.
9.3 Motivations and State of the Art
In this section we discuss in detail relevant access control requirements arising in the
context of geospatial applications and contexts, and then we survey related research
proposals and approaches.
9.3.1 Requirements for Spatially Aware Access Control
Geospatial data have a strategic relevance in various contexts, such as emergency
response, homeland security, marketing analysis tools, and environmental risks
control procedures. Most applications in these areas require a fine-granularity flex-
ible access control to geospatial data. A possible naive approach to support access
control is to build ad hoc data sets (maps) for each type of access the administra-
tor wants to grant: this has been the cartographic approach applied for many years
in the past. Such an approach is not suitable when the user community is large and
dynamic—which is today often the case in Web-based systems—and when the data
and the access control policies dynamically change—which is the case in appli-
cations such as emergency response. Another major drawback of the conventional
approach is that it does not support flexible protection granularities in the access
control policies, and it does not account for various levels of representation that data
may have in a geospatial database. The introduction of integrated data management
systems for geospatial data, such as current integrated GIS systems, characterized
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by comprehensive data models, and current developments in standards for geospa-
tial data such as GML [17] are today making possible the development of advanced
ACS that go beyond such naive approaches. However, despite the importance of data
protection, almost no eﬀorts have been devoted to the investigation of access control
models and systems; only very preliminary proposals exist. In order to position cur-
rent research, in what follows we overview major requirements that arise in access
control for geospatial data.
Richness and Multiplicity of Data Representations
Modern data management systems for geospatial data typically support multiple data
representations (such as attributive, vector-based, and topological representations);
additional representations are also often available, such as raster images. Not only
the same entity may be represented in the data repository according to multiple rep-
resentations, it can also be represented according to multiple dimensions (such as a
point, 0 dimension, or a region, 2 dimensions). Also geospatial objects may be com-
plex objects, consisting of subobjects. In some cases, one may want to hide some of
the components of a given spatial object. A suitable access control model for geospa-
tial data must thus: (i) Support the specification of authorizations against geospatial
objects at a very fine granularity level. (ii) Account for the various spatial represen-
tations. This means that if a user can see an aerial image from which certain objects
have been hidden, it is important that the same objects be hidden from the vector-
based representation of the same area. (iii) Account for the various object dimensions
and resolutions. This means that an administrator should be able to authorize a user to
see a given object at 0 dimension and not at higher dimensions, thus hiding detailed
information about the object shape. Similarly, in a raster representation, the admin-
istrator should be able to specify the resolutions according to which certain objects
can be seen. (iv) Support various access rights. In access control models, operations
that can be performed on the protected objects correspond to the access rights. This
allows one to express authorizations in terms of the operations supported by the
model according to which data are represented. It is thus important that in addition
to access rights such as read and write, access rights that correspond to meaningful
operations on geospatial objects be supported.
Dynamic and Mobile User Population
Many of the geospatial applications are characterized by a user population that con-
stantly changes and moves. Also, in many cases, users from diﬀerent administrative
domains or agencies may need to access the data. A suitable access control model
for geospatial data must thus perform the following: (i) Support attribute-based and
profile-based user specification. Relying on user login names for grant and revoke
authorization is very cumbersome and it is also a low-level approach. Recently,
several attribute-based and profile-based access control mechanisms have been pro-
posed, supported by techniques such as attribute certificates and standards such as
SAML [20]. Also recent extensions to the RBAC model [7] have been developed
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supporting access control across diﬀerent domains; under such an approach, a user
authorized to use a role in a domain is automatically able to enroll in a given role
in another domain. These techniques should certainly be incorporated into an access
control model for geospatial data. (ii) Supporting authorizations that are dynami-
cally enabled or disabled depending on the user location. It is important to notice
that an important requirement is related to the support of mobile users and in partic-
ular to the fact that a user may be authorized to access data depending also on the
user location or geographical region. For example, a taxi driver authorized to pick
up passengers only in a given area of Milano cannot access passenger information
when located in another area of the city. It is also important to be able to express
user location in terms of the physical position or the logical position (for example
“being inside of Milano train station”). Addressing such requirement also entails
using secure positioning techniques.
Dynamic Application Contexts
Geospatial data are today increasingly used in various circumstances. For
example, consider some data representing roads in a given region; such data can
be used for planning the road maintenance schedule or for managing an emergency.
It is likely that whether such data may be accessed or not by specific users depend on
the current situation, and it is thus likely that diﬀerent sets of access control policies
may need to be activated over time, also depending on the occurrence of specific
events. A suitable access control model for geospatial data must thus perform the
following: (i) Support mechanisms for policy grouping and modularization. It is im-
portant that security administrators be given mechanisms according to which they
can group policies into modules that are specific for handling specific situations. To
better address compliance requirements, such modules should also include metadata
to provide description and information about the policies inside the various modules.
(ii) Support event-based activation/deactivation of policy modules. This requirement
entails defining an event language and developing suitable event-monitoring tech-
niques. Techniques such as triggers and active rules, developed in the database and
the AI field, could be extended to support the automatic activation/deactivation of
policies. Notice, however, that a crucial issue is represented by techniques providing
high assurance event detection, to avoid an attacker preventing a relevant event from
being reported or injecting a false event.
9.3.2 State of the Art
As we have seen, geospatial applications have challenging requirements of
access control. Yet, such requirements have been only partially addressed by current
research. The spatially aware access control models proposed in literature can be cat-
egorized as two broad classes, based on whether they are more focused on geospatial
representation of data or user mobility, which are presented in what follows.
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Access Control for Geospatial Data
The first access control model for geographical data has been proposed [1] to
control the access to georeferenced Earth images. The purpose of such an approach
is the controlled dissemination of satellite images at diﬀerent levels of resolution
through a DAC policy. In particular, authorizations state which images users are al-
lowed to access and at which resolution. The system, however, is limited in that it
only deals with satellite images. To overcome these limitations, an ACS has been
recently developed for the protection of vector-based data available on Web [5]. The
underlying model is simple but anticipates some ideas that have been more exten-
sively developed by GEO-RBAC. The central concept in such model is that of spatial
authorization. A spatial authorization is defined by the tuple < u, f t, p,w >, where
u denotes the user, f t the object specified in terms of spatial feature types (such as
building or house), p the operation in the form of Web service to be performed on
spatial objects of the specified type (such as InsertOb ject, to introduce a new spatial
element), and w is the authorization window. The authorization window indicates
the geographical scope of the authorization, that is, the portion of space in which the
authorization applies. Accordingly, one can state, for example, that user u is allowed
to carry out operation p on all objects of type f t located in the authorization window
w. Furthermore, the model supports the specification of administrative functions for
the creation and update of spatial authorizations based on a decentralized admin-
istration policy. The notion of authorization window has also been integrated in a
diﬀerent access control model, which has been developed for regulating the access
to a spatial database [2]. The peculiarity of this approach is that the database is based
on a complex spatial data model, enabling multiple levels of spatial representation
at multiple granularities. The access control model thus enables the specification of
which objects at which granularity and in which portion of space can be selected and
modified.
A more recent approach integrating geospatial and security standards to sup-
port controlled access to spatial information through geo-Web services has been re-
cently developed [19]. In such an approach, a policy specification language, referred
to as GeoXACML, is defined as a geospatial extension of the OASIS eXtensible
access control markup language (XACML). GeoXACML supports the specification
of rules which enable or deny the access to geospatial objects based on spatial crite-
ria, such as topological relationships. As an example, consider the rule which states
that an operation can be performed only on buildings which are located with the ad-
ministrative boundary of Washington, DC. This approach has some similarities with
the notion of authorization window, though in the window-based model [5] not only
restrictions over objects can be specified but also on an administration policy.
Access Control in Mobile Applications
None of the previous models is conceived for use in a dynamic environment, which
instead is the main concern of spatial and non-spatial context aware access control
models.
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Non-spatial context-aware access control models include generalized TRBAC
(GTRBAC) [18], a RBAC-based model which incorporates a set of language
constructs for the specification of various temporal constraints on roles, including
constraints on role enabling, role activation, user-to-role assignments, and
permission-to-role assignments. X-GTRBAC [7] is another approach which aug-
ments GTRBAC with XML for supporting the policy enforcement in a hetero-
geneous, distributed environment. In addition to temporal constraints, the model
also supports non-temporal contextual constraints. The approach, however, is more
focused on the software engineering aspects of the access control rather than on
the expressivity of the policy specification language. A notable approach is the one
proposed through the Generalized RBAC (GRBAC) [10]. GRBAC introduces the
concept of environment roles; that is, roles that can be activated based on the value
of conditions in the environment where the request has been made. Environmental
conditions include time, location, and other contextual information that is relevant to
access control. If compared with GEO-RBAC, the concepts of role extent and user
position are close to that of context variables. However, the mechanism of contexts
is very general and does not account for the specificity of spatial information, such
as the multi-granularity of position and the spatial relationships that may exist be-
tween the spatial elements in space. Moreover, in GEO-RBAC a common spatial data
model is adopted in order to provide a uniform and standard-based representation of
locational aspects that, notably, involve not only roles but also protected objects.
The spatial dimension of access control is the basic component of the approach
presented in [15]. In such work, an extension of the RBAC model is proposed based
on the notion of spatial role, intended as a role that is automatically activated when
the user is in a given position. The space model is however very simple and targeted
to wireless network applications. It consists of a set of adjacent cells and the position
of the user is the cell or the aggregate of cells containing it. The spatial granularity of
the position is thus fixed while the space is rigidly structured and the position itself
does not have any semantic meaning but simply a geometric value. By contrast, in
GEO-RBAC the granularity of the user position may depend on the role of the user;
thus no assumption is made on the space layout. Moreover, in GEO-RBAC the spatial
dimension integrates geometric and semantic knowledge about the world.
A diﬀerent approach which combines space and time is presented in [9]; this
approach borrows from GEO-RBAC the distinction between real position and logical
position and from GTRBAC the notion of temporal context. Such a model, however,
does not include the notion of schema, neither supports important features of GEO-
RBAC such as hierarchies of enabled roles and spatially aware SoD constraints.
9.4 An Access Control Model for Location-aware Applications:
GEO-RBAC
GEO-RBAC is a comprehensive access control model specifically developed to
address access control requirements of applications characterized by users that are
members of mobile organizations. By mobile organization, we mean a community of
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individuals that, because of the role they have in the community, need to access com-
mon information resources through LBS. Mobile organizations thus consist not only
of enterprises operating on field such as fleet management and resources tracking
but also of health care and leisure organizations, and military and civilian coalitions
created in response to a crisis, for example natural disaster and war. In these orga-
nizations, the mobile members are characterized not only by an identity but also by
a functional role. Because of the diﬀerent activities of the organization’s members,
it is reasonable to consider that LBS (services for short) are requested based on the
roles of individuals and also their position.
The GEO-RBAC model addresses the above issues; it relies on RBAC standard
and, like RBAC, is based on the concept of role. Moreover, it is structured in levels,
referred as Core, Hierarchical, and Constrained GEO-RBAC, respectively. Of these
levels, we describe here the Core level, which constitutes the basic component. For
the additional levels, we refer the readers to [12].
Before proceeding, we introduce the running example that will be used through-
out the chapter. Consider an LBS application for a university campus. The campus
consists of various buildings and areas, such as departments, libraries, and recreative
areas, each occupying a position in space. From an organizational point of view, peo-
ple in the campus can play one or more functions, such as teachers, students, visitors,
and, say, library subscribers. The members of the campus are connected to a wireless
network and equipped with a location-aware PDA by using which they access vari-
ous LBSs. Assume that John is a student and also a library subscriber. When located
within one of the libraries of the campus, John is presented with various services,
for example the book-loan service to request the loan of a book. Instead, when in a
department, he can request the class timetable.
9.4.1 Overview of the Core Level
By adapting the definition in [13] to our model, we say that Core GEO-RBAC
defines a minimum collection of elements which are required to completely achieve
a GEO-RBAC system. The basic notion is that of spatial role, which describes a
spatially bounded function for a user. Two other concepts, however, are notewor-
thy: (a) the position model which describes the position of the mobile user; (b)
the notions of role schema and role instance which provide a representation of
the role at two levels, respectively, the intensional and the extensional level. For
the representation of the position of the user and the spatial properties of roles,
we rely on current geospatial standards [16]. In particular, we describe the spatial
objects which are located in the reference space in terms of simple features [16]
(hereinafter, features). Features have an identity, thematic properties, and can be
mapped onto a position in the reference space. A feature is denoted by its iden-
tifier. For example, UniMi is the identifier of the spatial object which describes
the properties of a campus and its position. The position of a feature is rep-
resented through a geometry which can be of type point, line or polygon, or
recursively a collection of geometries. Further, geometries can be related by diﬀer-
ent types of relationship. Among them, the reference set of topological relations is
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{Dis joint, Touch, In,Contains, Equal,Cross,Overlap}. These relations are binary,
mutually exclusive (if one is true, the others are false), and they are a refinement
of the well-known set of topological relations [16]. Moreover, features have an
application-dependent semantics that is expressed through the concept of feature
type. A feature type captures the intensional meaning of the entity, for example,
Campus and Department. The extension of a feature type is a set of semantically
homogeneous features.
9.4.2 Basic Concepts
The Position Model
The notion of position is fundamental since it characterizes the mobile user. Un-
like most proposals in mobile computing which describe the position uniquely
in geometric terms, for example a point, we introduce, for the sake of flexibil-
ity, the distinction between the real and the logical position. The real position
corresponds to the position of the user on Earth acquired through some
positioning technology. Real positions can thus be represented as geometric ele-
ments of diﬀerent types since, depending on the chosen technology and accuracy
requirements, they may correspond to points or polygons. Conversely, the logical
position is defined at a higher level of abstraction to represent positions in a way
that is almost independent from the underlying positioning technology. Further, be-
sides a geometry, the logical position has a semantics. For example, logical positions
can be a house, an address number, or a road, which are represented in terms of
spatial feature types. The logical position is computed from real positions by us-
ing a location mapping function. For example, a location mapping function can be
defined to map a position acquired through global positioning system (GPS) onto
the closer road segment. More formally, given a feature type f t, a position mapping
function for f t is a function m f t which, given a real position rp, returns a logical
position corresponding to an instance of f t having rp as real position. As we will
see, since the localization may respond to diﬀerent application requirements, for ex-
ample, with respect to accuracy, the meaning of location may vary depending on the
role. For example, the position of a generic campus member may be coarsely defined
in terms of campus sectors, assuming that the campus area is subdivided in sectors,
whereas the position of the teacher can be represented at a higher resolution by an
address.
Spatial Role
The concept of spatial role is the distinguishing aspect of our model. To account for
the spatial context, a spatial role is defined not only by a name as in RBAC but also
by a role extent. The extent of a role defines the boundaries of the region contained
in the reference space. A user, who has been conferred a role r, is thus recognized
to eﬀectively play such a role only when logically located within the extent of r.
For example, CampusMember(UniMi) is a spatial role: CampusMember is the role
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name and UniMi is the role extent, specifically the identifier of a spatial feature of
type Campus denoting, among others, a polygonal space. An individual, which is a
member of the campus, is recognized to play the role of CampusMember and thus
authorized to invoke the services associated to the role, only when located in the
polygonal extent of the campus.
Each role is assigned a set of permissions. A permission corresponds to a service.
For example, the service BookLoan of the running example is assigned to the spatial
role LibarySubscriber(MyLibrary). The terms permission and service are used in
this chapter in an interchangeable way. Like RBAC, when a user connects to the
LBS application, a new session is started. Then the user selects the roles, among
those which have been assigned to him/her that they wish to play. This set represents
the session roles and the elements of the set are said to be activated. Unlike RBAC,
however, in our model, session roles have in addition a status which is enabled or
disabled. For a session role to be enabled, the user should be logically located within
the space of the corresponding role extent. As the user moves, the status of roles
change. Therefore, depending on the position of the user, only a subset of the session
roles is enabled and permissions granted. As a result, the set of services which the
user can access at a given point in time depends on both the session roles and the
position of the user.
Role Schema and Instance
To provide a more compact representation of semantically homogeneous roles de-
fined over diﬀerent extents, we introduce the distinction between role schema and
role instance. A role instance is a role defined over a specific extent, in compli-
ance with the role schema. Note that the terms roles instance and spatial role are
used as synonyms. A role schema defines common properties of roles with a sim-
ilar meaning and thus simplifies the specification of roles and ultimately role en-
gineering. Specifically, a role schema defines: (a) a common name for a set of
roles; (b) the type of role extent; (c) the type of logical location; (d) the map-
ping function relating the real position with the logical position. For example,
CampusMember(Campus, S ector,msector) is a schema the instances of which are
roles having the following properties: the roles have the same name
CampusMember; Campus is the type of the role extent; Sector is the type of logical
position which is computed by applying function msector to the real position. Once a
schema is specified, the corresponding instances can be simply created by specify-
ing the role name and its extent, for example CampusMember(UniMi). Notice that
UniMi is a feature of type Campus and defines the boundary of the spatial role.
Because roles are assigned permissions and because of the two diﬀerent levels of
role representation, it seems reasonable to assign permissions to both role schemas
and role instances. The permissions which are assigned to a schema are then inherited
and shared by all the instances of the schema. For example, if we assign the service
getMap to the role schema CampusMember, it means that such a service can be
accessed by all the members of the campus. For the sake of flexibility, however,
permissions can be assigned also to single-role instances.
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9.4.3 Specification of Core GEO-RBAC
Now, we present the above concepts in more formal terms. Core GEO-RBAC is
presented as organized in a number of logical parts, one for each major set of the
RBAC model, that is roles, permissions, users, and sessions.
The general structure of the model is illustrated in Fig. 9.1.
We use the graphical representation adopted for RBAC. In defining the model, we
refer to the notation introduced in the previous section and summarized in Table 9.1.
Preliminarily, we introduce the notion of partial ordering of features and feature
types. Let FT be the set of feature types and f ti, f t j ∈ FT , with i  j, be two
elements of the set. We say that f ti is contained in f t j, denoted by f ti ⊆ f t f t j, if
for each feature fi of type f ti, a feature f j of type f t j exists such that the geometry
of fi is contained in the geometry of f j. For example, the relation of containment
between Town and Region is written as Town ⊆ f t Region. Similarly, we say that the
feature fi is contained in feature f j, denoted by fi ⊆ f f j, when the geometry of fi is
contained in the geometry of f j. As we will see, such relationships will be useful in
characterizing the relationships between locations and roles.
PRMS
OPS OBJ
RI
RS
SPA
S
SPA I
URPOS
SES
SUA
Session-Roles
Ses
sion
Use
rs
EnabledSessionRoles SPATIAL
ROLES
Fig. 9.1. Core GEO-RBAC
Table 9.1. Notation for the main sets used in GEO-RBAC
Notation Meaning
FT Feature types
F Features
R Role names
S ES Sessions
U Users
REXT FT Role extent types
LPOS FT Logical positions types
LPOS Logical positions
RPOS Real positions
M Position mapping functions
OPS Operations
OBJ Objects
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Role Schema and Instance
A role schema defines a common name for a set of roles, the role extent type, the log-
ical position type, and the position mapping functions relating the real position with
the logical position. A role instance is defined over an extent of the type specified in
the corresponding schema, while the logical position of the individual playing such
a role is determined by the position mapping function specified in the schema alike.
The formal definitions of role schema and instance are reported below [4]:
Definition 9.2 (Role Schema). A Role Schema is a tuple < r, ext, loc,mloc > where:
• r ∈ R;
• ext ∈ REXT FT;
• loc ∈ LPOS FT;
• loc ⊆ f t ext;
• mloc ∈ M is a location mapping function for feature type loc.
We denote with RS the set of role schemas and we assume that, given a role name
r ∈ R, r is unique in RS . A role schema is also denoted as r(ext, loc,mloc).
Definition 9.3 (Role Instance). Given a role schema rs ∈ RS , an instance ri of rs is
a pair < r, e > where r is the name of the role in schema rs, thus r = rs.r and e ∈ F
is a feature of type rs.ext. The schema of ri is denoted by S chemaO f (ri). We denote
with RI the set of role instances for all role schemas. A role instance is also denoted
as r(e).
Permission
A permission is associated with each service. In our model, permissions can be asso-
ciated either with the role schema and inherited by all role instances of the schema or
directly with the role instances. Such diﬀerent granularities are formalized by intro-
ducing two functions: S PrmsAssignment, relating roles schemas and permissions
sets; I PrmsAssignment relating spatial roles, thus role instances, to specific per-
missions. Function I PrmsAssignment∗ is then introduced to combine permissions
directly assigned to spatial roles with permissions inherited from their role schema.
Formally [4]:
Definition 9.4 (Permissions). The set of permissions PRMS is defined as PRMS =
2(OPS×OBJ). We also define:
• S PAS: RS ×PRMS , a many-to-many mapping permission-to-spatial role schema
assignment relation;
• S PrmsAssignment : RS → 2PRMS , the mapping of spatial role schema onto
a set of permissions. Given a role schema rs, S PrmsAssignment(rs) = {p ∈
PRMS | < rs, p >∈ S PAS };
• S PAI: RI×PRMS , a many-to-many mapping permission-to-spatial role instance
assignment relation;
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• I PrmsAssignment : RI → 2PRMS the mapping of spatial role instance onto
a set of permissions. Given a role instance ri, I PrmsAssignment(ri) = {p ∈
PRMS | < ri, p >∈ S PAI};
• I PrmsAssignment∗ : RI → 2PRMS such that given a role instance ri,
I PrmsAssignment∗(ri) = I PrmsAssignment(ri) ∪ S PrmsAssignment(S che-
maO f (ri))}. Hence, the permissions of a role are those assigned to its schema
plus those directly assigned to the instance.
Users and Session
Spatial roles are assigned to users. The definition of the model for this part is con-
ceptually analogous to that in RBAC. In particular, given a set of users, the following
relations are defined: the many-to-many relation S UA relates users and role in-
stances; the function S R AssignedUser maps a role instance onto the set of users
which can activate that role. Formally [4]:
Definition 9.5 (Users). We define:
• S UA ⊆ U × RI, a mapping user-to-spatial role instance assignment relation;
• S R AssignedUser : RI → 2U, the mapping of spatial role instance onto a set
of users. Formally, S R AssignedUser(< r, e >∈ RI) = {u ∈ U |(u, < r, e >)
∈ S UA}.
When a user logs in, a new session is activated and a number of roles are
selected to be included in the session role set. Given a session s, the follow-
ing two functions are defined: S essionUser(s) corresponds to the user of the ses-
sion; S essionRoles(s) corresponds to the role that can be potentially activated in s.
Formally [4]:
Definition 9.6 (Sessions). We define:
• S essionUser: S ES → U, the mapping from a session s to the user of s;
• S essionRoles: S ES → 2RI with S essionRoles(s) ⊆ {< r, e >∈ RI |(S ession-
User(s), < r, e >) ∈ S UA}.
Access Control Mechanism
The session roles are the roles that the user of the session has selected. However, for
a session role to be enabled, the user should be logically located within the space
of the corresponding role extent. Therefore, depending on the user position during
that session, only a subset of the session roles is enabled and permissions granted. In
order to compute the logical position of a user playing a role r in a session, the loca-
tion mapping function defined in the schema of r is applied to the user real position,
provided by the external environment. Hence, if the logical position of the user is spa-
tially contained in the extent of r, the role is enabled and thus the set of permissions
assigned to the corresponding role is determined. Given a user’s request, the access
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control mechanism determines whether the permission requested by the user belongs
to the set of permission associated to the set of enabled roles ER. If it is the case the
permission is granted otherwise it is rejected. The set of enabled roles ER in session
s and real position rp is computed by the function EnabledS essionRole(s, rp).
Definition 9.7 (Authorization Control Function). An access request is a tuple ar =
〈s, rp, p, o〉 ∈ S ES ×RPOS ×OPS ×OBJ. ar can be satisfied at position rp ∈ RPOS
if:
(p, o) ∈
⋃
y∈EnabledS essionRoles(s,rp)
I PrmsAssignment∗(y).
Basic objects
FT = {Campus, Library, S ector,Address)} with: S ector ⊆ f t Campus
F = {Purdue,MyLib} with: MyLib ⊆ f Purdue
PRMS = {p1, p2, p3, p4} with
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p1 = GetMap
p2 = S howClassT imetable
p3 = BookLoan
p4 = BookS earch
Schema
R = {T eacher, S tudent, LibraryS ubscriber}
RS = {S t,T e, Li} with
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
S t =< S tudent,Campus, S ector,mS ector >
T e =< T eacher,Campus, Address,mAddress >
Li =< LibraryS ubscriber, Library, Library,mLibrary >
Instances
RI = {rS t, rT e, rLi} with
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
rS t = S tudent(Purdue)
rT e = T eacher(Purdue)
rLi = LibraryS uscriber(MyLib)
Permission assignment
S PAS = {(p1, S t), (p1,T e), (p2, S t), (p2,T e), (p3, Li), (p4, Li)}
User assignment
U = {S ara, John}
S UA = {sua1 , sua2 , sua3} with
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
sua1 = 〈John, S tudent(Purdue)〉
sua2 = 〈S ara,T eacher(Purdue)〉
sua3 = 〈John, LibraryS ubscriber(MyLib)〉
Sessions
S ES = {s1}, UserS ession(s1) = {John}
S essionRoles(s1) = {S tudent(Purdue), LibrayS ubscriber(MyLib)}
EnabledRoles
EnabledS essionRoles(s1, loc1) = {{S tudent(Purdue),
LibrayS ubscriber(MyLib)}} if John is in MyLib
Fig. 9.2. An example of a GEO-RBAC policy
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Example
Finally, we summarize the GEO-RBAC concepts (see Fig. 9.2) by presenting the
access control policy defined for the running example. The policy is built as fol-
lows. First, we define the sets of feature types, features, and permissions used in our
policy. Then we specify the following role schemas: the Student schema specifies
that an individual can play the role of student only when located within a campus.
Campus is a spatial feature type and Purdue is an instance of campus. Further, the
logical position of a student is represented by a sector of the campus, of feature type
Sector. The Teacher schema is defined in a similar way for the individuals who are
teachers in the campus. The logical position of a teacher is represented by an address.
The Library Subscriber schema specifies that individuals can play such a role only
within a library. The logical position of a subscriber is of type library. Notice that in
this case, the logical position has the same granularity of the role extent; therefore,
the actual position within the library is not relevant for the application. The role in-
stances we consider are student at Purdue (i.e. Student(Purdue)), teacher in the same
campus (i.e. Teacher(Purdue)), and subscriber of the campus library named MyLib
(i.e. LibrarySubscriber(MyLib)). We then specify how permissions, namely informa-
tion services, are tied to the previous schemas. For example, the service book-loan of
the running example is assigned to the LibrarySubscriber schema and thus is inher-
ited by its role instances. Now suppose that Sara is a teacher at Purdue, while John
is a student in the same campus and also a subscriber of MyLib. Assume John to be
the only user connected to the system. Until John is outside the Purdue campus, John
is not allowed to access any information service. Conversely, when inside the library
MyLib, John is recognized to be a library subscriber, besides a student, and thus can
request a book loan.
9.5 A Reference Architecture for GEO-RBAC
The GEO-RBAC model defines the conceptual constructs supporting the specifica-
tion of access control policies. We now complement the discussion by presenting a
reference architecture for an ACS based on GEO-RBAC. The purpose is to devise the
main building blocks of the access control system and at the same time the key oper-
ational aspects. We present in particular two diﬀerent architectural frameworks, the
first relying on a centralized architecture and the other on a distributed architecture
for access control in large-scale applications.
9.5.1 A Centralized Architecture
The centralized ACS assumes that all access control functionalities, namely policy
administration and enforcement, are implemented by a unique component which fil-
ters user requests accepting only those which are authorized by the current security
policy. The general architectural framework that we assume is the one shown in
Fig. 9.3. Such framework consists of three fundamental components [11]:
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Fig. 9.3. Centralized architecture
• a set of mobile users equipped with mobile terminals and connected to a wireless
network. Users are assumed to be identified by their terminal ID.
• the Application Server providing a set of location-aware information services.
Such services are mapped onto permissions of GEO-RBAC.
• the ACS. It is a trusted component filtering the users’ requests. To obtain the po-
sition of the user, the ACS accesses a Location Server which aggregates location
data from diﬀerent sources such as the network and mobile terminals equipped
with GPS (connected by dotted lines in Fig. 9.3 ) and responds to queries such
as retrieve the position of terminal ID. Notice that to prevent uncontrolled dis-
closure of location data, the ACS is the only component enabled to query the
Location Server.
A request for a service is processed as follows: the user requests the service by
sending a request message to the ACS. The ACS then determines whether the request
can be accepted, and if it is the case the request message is properly restructured and
sent to the Application Server. Finally, the requested information is then sent back to
the ACS and then, through it, to the user.
In this section, we focus in particular on the key choices underlying the archi-
tecture, concerning in particular the definition of an event-driven approach to the
specification of the access control mechanism.
The Access Control Mechanism
The access control mechanism applies the access control function to determine the
set of enabled roles and thus the services which are accessible to the user at a given
location. For the computation of the enabled roles,we need to define at what stage
these roles are determined. We devise two possible strategies:
• The status of roles is computed exclusively upon user request. When the user
sends a request to the ACS, the system determines which roles are enabled and
then based on this information determines whether the request is accepted or
rejected. The approach is thus user-driven.
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• The status of roles is autonomously checked by an agent tracking the position of
the user connected to the LBS system. As a state transition occurs for a role, that
is, its status changes from enabled to disabled or vice versa, the new status is
recorded and the event is notified to interested system components. The strategy
is thus event-driven.
The simplest approach is the user-driven one because the position of the user
is computed on demand and thus the status of roles is determined only when re-
quired. This approach has, however, a major drawback, in that the services which are
available in a given session at a given instant are not known until the user makes an
explicit access request. Therefore, it may occur that the user requires a service which
is not accessible in that position or that the user is not aware of available services at
a given position.
Conversely, when the event-driven strategy is adopted, the status of each role
is determined asynchronously with respect to user requests. Therefore, such infor-
mation needs to be recorded by the ACS. Although more complex, this approach
overcomes the drawbacks of the user-driven strategy: user requests can be more ef-
ficiently processed because the current status of roles is available at the time of the
request and thus need not they be computed; the users can determine the eﬀective
roles can play, before a request is made. Because it is arguably more flexible, the
event-driven approach is the one we adopt.
Event-driven Architecture of the ACS
From an architectural point of view, the proposed organization for the ACS is based
on the following major components:
• The Policy DB is a database storing the security policies specifying, among other
information, the spatial roles, the services available to each role, and the roles
assigned to each user.
• The Session DB records the status of sessions. The status at time t of session s
is represented by the tuple < s, t, S R, ER >, where S R is the set of session roles,
thus the roles selected by the user among those which have been assigned to her;
ER is the set of roles enabled in s at time t.
• An agent called Role Tracker. It periodically retrieves from the Location Server
the position of the users of current sessions and determines whether a state tran-
sition has occurred for the roles of each session. If this is the case, the event is
communicated to the Event Manager.
• In response to a Role Tracker event, the Event Manager updates the status of
sessions in Session DB and notifies the event to the corresponding terminal.
This architecture focuses on the operational meaning of access control enforce-
ment. A number of issues however remain open. Among these, a challenging issue
is related to the fact that LBS may be not only of pull type, like for example, direc-
tory services (e.g. Where is the closest restaurant), but also of push type. Under the
push model, services are still requested by the user (i.e. subscribed), but the informa-
tion is provided on a continuous basis. An example is the service which allows one
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to be automatically notified about nearby traﬃc jams. Because in a location-aware
context the availability of the service depends on the position of the user, if the user
changes position in time, it may occur that the user is no longer in a position which
authorizes him/her to access the service. To our knowledge, this issue has not been
addressed yet.
9.5.2 The Challenge of a Distributed Architecture for Location-based
Applications
The above centralized architecture has two major drawbacks. First, the architecture is
not scalable. Suppose that an organization introduces an application in which LBSs
are provided by several applications servers. In such a case, a centralized policy en-
forcement creates a bottleneck since all requests for all application servers should
be first sent to the ACS and eventually dispatched to the recipients. Similarly, the
administrative operations, such as the addition or removal of a service by a service
provider, should be managed by the central security administrator. The second draw-
back is that it does not address the authentication issue. On the other hand, as already
remarked, relying on user login names for grant and revoke authorization is cumber-
some and it is also a low level approach.
To overcome the limits of the centralized approach, we propose an access
control framework based on a decentralized architecture. Consider the following sce-
nario: suppose that, in our campus, services are provided by various service providers
through a number of application servers AS 1, ..., AS n. Moreover, roles are assigned
permissions to request services from diﬀerent providers. Therefore, a many-to-many
relationship exists between the set of application servers and the set of roles: an indi-
vidual, because of his role, can access multiple application servers, and vice versa an
application server can be accessed by individuals playing diﬀerent roles. To enable
an eﬃcient access to services and at the same time allow a simple interaction with the
application, we propose an architectural framework based on two key design choices:
(a) the access control is distributed among a set of autonomous ACS, ACS 1, .., ACS n
where ACS j with j ∈ {1, ..., n} controls the access to application server AS j. The ac-
cess to each application server is then governed by a local policy administered by a
local security administrator. Therefore, there are n local policies and n local security
administrators. (b) The enforcement of the local policy is initiated on the client side
represented by the mobile terminal and then completed on the server side.
We now describe in more detail this approach focusing in particular on the
problem of user-role authentication and policy enforcement.
User–Role Authentication
We introduce the problem of user–role authentication through an example. Suppose
that John is assigned therole student. Then when John presents such a role to the
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ACS, the system is expected to grant access to the services assigned to students.
Now the question which arises is how can the system trust John. In a centralized
architecture, the answer is simple since the ACS maintains information on users
and on all pairs user–role (user–role assignment relation). Therefore when John is
first authenticated and then presents his role, the ACS verifies whether the bind-
ing < John, student > is specified in the user–role assignment relation. In a dis-
tributed context, however, this approach is not flexible enough: when a new user is
entered into or removed from the system or a new role is assigned or deassigned
to a user, such information must be replicated in every local policy. Such operation
results not only are tedious and complex to manage but can also lead to inconsistent
polices.
We adopt thus a diﬀerent approach. The idea is that the user first obtains a digital
certificate which specifies the user’s role; then this certificate is presented to the ACS
to certify the role assignment for the user and to subsequently grant the access to the
requested service. The advantage of this approach is that the user-role assignment
relation does not need to be specified at the level of local policy.
Digital certificates contain a number of attributes, such as the name, a serial
number, expiration dates, and the digital signature of the certificate-issuing author-
ity so that a recipient can verify that the certificate is real. Moreover, certificates
hold spatial role information (role certificates). As far as we know, the idea of
certificates containing spatial information has been not explored yet. The certifi-
cation authority in charge of issuing role certificates is called role provider. User–
role authentication is then performed as follows: the user downloads certificates
from the role provider, one for each role, and stores them on his mobile terminal.
To invoke a service, the user first selects the certificate corresponding to the role
he wants to play in the interaction and then transmits it to the application server
along with the service requests. In such a way, the user is authenticated along with
his role.
Decentralized Policy Enforcement
Suppose now that a user, after being authenticated, requests the permission of invok-
ing a service. Following the GEO-RBAC model, such permission is granted only if
the user is located within the extent of a spatial role authorized to request that ser-
vice. The question we now address is how to assess whether a relationship of spatial
containment holds between the user position and the role extent. A first solution is
to apply the same approach adopted in the centralized architecture, that is, the ACS,
which receives the user’s request, obtains the position of the user from the loca-
tion server and then, based on role information, determines whether the containment
constraint is satisfied. The drawback of this approach is that in large applications,
it introduces a significant communication burden. We thus opt for a diﬀerent solu-
tion in which policy enforcement is initiated on clients. The idea is as follows: since
clients have knowledge of the roles assigned to users because of the role certificates
stored on terminals, clients are potentially able to reject requests which cannot be
satisfied and thus avoid sending useless requests to the servers. For this approach to
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be viable, however, clients must be aware of the position of users and then be able
to match such position against role extents. Clients can obtain the position from the
Location Server or from the positioning device eventually installed on terminal. In
any case, since clients may be not trusted, it is important to ensure the integrity of
position data. To that purpose, we assume position data to be provided along with a
digital signature by a Secure Location Server.
Access control operations on clients are then carried out by a software component
called local access control (LAC). Based on role certificates and user’s position, the
LAC determines the roles, which are enabled, and then, if there is at least an enabled
role, it transmits to the application server an encrypted access request that includes
the role certificate and the position. Note that the application server trusts the position
sent by the client because the position has a digital signature aﬃxed. Therefore, a
malicious client cannot forge such information.
Now we consider what happens on the server side when a request is sent by
LAC. The request is received by one of the ACS defined in the framework, say
ACS j. Based on the role certificate and position data sent by the client, ACS j verifies
whether the role is enabled. Notice that this operation is performed twice, first at the
client and then at the server side. The reason is that the client may not be trusted,
and thus, the server needs to make sure that constraints are fulfilled, with the advan-
tage that in the case of trusted clients, unnecessary request processing at the server
is avoided. Finally, the system checks whether the requested service is one of the
services, which have been assigned to the specified role based on the local security
policy. If this is the case, the access is permitted.
The decentralized architecture comprehensive of the LAC layer, the Role Provider,
the Secure Location Server, and the set {ACS 1, .., ACS n} of ACS is shown in Fig. 9.4.
Fig. 9.4. Decentralized architecture
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Concluding Remarks
It may have been noticed that in discussing the two architectural approaches, the
centralized and the distributed one, we have focused on diﬀerent aspects. In the cen-
tralized solution, the major concern is for the strategy to apply for the enforcement of
the security policy which can be user-driven or event-driven. In the decentralized so-
lution, the focus is on distributing the administrative and enforcement functionalities.
The question which has not been addressed yet is whether in the decentralized con-
text the enforcement strategy is user-driven or event-driven. This problem deserves
a careful analysis, especially if we want to account for services that are not only of
pull but also of push type. This issue will be addressed as part of our future work.
9.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have discussed issues related to access control in location-based
applications. Such applications are characterized by a large variety of requirements
aﬀecting both the conceptual definition of access control models and the architec-
tures of ACS. In this chapter, we have shown a rich model, GEO-RBAC, specifically
tailored to geospatial applications with mobile users and then illustrated possible
architectures supporting such model.
Several issues, however, are still to be addressed concerning the architectural
aspects. In particular, the integration of the privacy dimension into access control,
following the guidelines proposed in [11], is an important issue, given the existing
privacy regulations and the increased privacy concerns by citizens and organizations.
The mapping of GEO-RBAC onto an existing architectural framework, X-GTRBAC,
is also crucial to obtain an ACS supporting the specification and enforcement of a
rich set of context-based access control policies.
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